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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

J. R. STONE COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Supreme Court No.

-vs-

14834

RAYMOND S . KEA TE,
Defendant and Respondent.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
---0000000---

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action wherein the plaintiff-appellant seeks
remedies and adjudications with respect to an option to purchase
real property which was given by plaintiff-appellant to
defendant-respondent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment construing
certain provisions of the Option but the lower court declined
to grant a judgment declaring the Option void and further
declined to enter a decree of specific performance.
THE NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks an ajudication by this Court
that under the facts and circumstances of the case the option

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-2to purchase real property granted by plaintiff-appellant to
defendant-respondent is of no further force and effect.

In

the alternative, if the Option is still capable of exercise,
plaintiff-appellant seeks a reversal of certain aspects of the
declaratory judgment which purport to construe the Option.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In January, 1971, defendant-respondent, Raymond
Keate,

s.

(hereinafter referred to as "Keate") contacted Gerald R.

Turner, a Salt Lake attorney, for the purposes of assisting
Keate in obtaining financing for his air filter manufacturing
business, Fiber Glass Products, Inc.

(Tr. Vol. II, pp. 44,40).

Fiber Glass Products was in need of funds in excess of $400, 000 ..
for working capital, equipment and construction of a new plant
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 40).

Attorney Turner experienced difficulty

in obtaining this financing because the amounts were large
and the available collateral was insufficient (Tr. Vol. II, PP·
44, 49).

After several contacts with various lenders (Tr. Vol. IV
pp. 14-15), Attorney Turner focused on the lease guarantee
provisions of the Small Business Administration regulations
(Tr. Vol.

IV, pp. 15 - 16) .

Under t hese regulations, a landlo~

could purchase the building, lease it to Fiber Glass Products
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and the SBA would guarantee the landlord the lease payments.
Turner informed Keate that this arrangement maximized the value
of available collateral by using both the building and the
lease as collateral and obtaining the funds through two different
borrowers (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 15-16).
Inasmuch as the SBA lease guarantee provisions appeared
to be the only arrangement with any probability of success
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 16), Keate requested Turner to proceed with
that application (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 16).

However, one aspect

of the transaction was unsatisfactory to Keate inasmuch as he
felt the business could be sold in a year at a handsome profit.
In order to meet this problem, Keate was given the option to
purchase the building.

The reasons for giving the option to

Keate rather than to Fiber Glass were that it would help Keate
in attempting to sell the business (Tr. Vol. II, p. 64)1 and
would permit Keate to make a profit if the business went
broke

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 641 Vol. IV, p. 941 Vol. III, PP· 12-13) •
1,

One vital prerequisite to obtaining the lease guarantee
financing was locating a person willing to purchase the building
and lease it to Fiber Glass Products under this arrangement.
Attorney Turner was aware that his brother-in-law,
John R. Stone, was involved in the construction business and
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i

-4may be willing to participate in the transaction as the

Mr.

owner and lessor (Tr. Vol. II, p. 49; Vol IV, p. 18).

Stone consented to this participation so long as it was through
a corporation.

Thus, the plaintiff-appellant, J. R. Stone

Company (hereinafter referred to as "Stone Company") was
organized.
Although problems were encountered including a change
of the construction site, the arrangement was finally carried
out.

On October 4, 1971, Stone Company borrowed the money

for the purchase of the real property and the construction of
the building (Ex. 7).

The loan was secured by a trust deed

describing the building (Ex. 8).

By a lease dated September 30,

1972, Stone leased the building to Fiber Glass Products
Company.

However, Fiber Glass Products did not occupy the

building until February, 1972,

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 27).

of the lease is before the court as Exhibit 4.

A copy

On September 30,

1971, Fiber Glass Company got the working capital loan from
valley Bank & Trust Company (Ex. 39).

This note was also

secured by another trust deed on the building (Ex. 3 9) .

Neither

John R. Stone nor Stone Company received the benefit of the
proceeds of this loan.
Glass company business.

It was used exclusively in the Fiber
On September 30, 1971, the Option
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-5to Purchase, the document in dispute in this case, was prepared
by Gerald Turner, and executed by Stone Company.
the Option is before the Court as Exhibit 3.

A copy of

It is important

to note that although all of the transactions involved Fiber
Glass Products, the Option ran in favor of Raymond Keate
personally.

There was never any written authorization from

Fiber Glass Products authorizing Keate to personally receive
this benefit (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 12-13).
Fiber Glass moved into the building in February, 1972,
and began its operation (Tr. Vol. I, p. 27).

On July 10,

1974, Fiber Glass discontinued business and vacated the building.
At the time the building was vacated, neither Raymond Keate
nor any employee or representative of Fiber Glass Company made
any attempt to notify John R. Stone or Stone Company that the
building was being vacated (Tr. Vol. I, P · 4 6) •
Fiber Glass Products, under the complete supervision
of Keate (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 41-42), occupied the building in
total disregard of its obligations under the Lease.

Despite

the obligations of paragraph 10 of the Lease (ex. 4), Fiber
Glass company left the property in totally untenantable condition
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 28; Vol. II, p. 7).

There was a large

accumulation of debris and garbage strewn about the building
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-6(Tr. Vol. II, p. 73; Exs.
(1),

{m),

(n),

(q),

(s),

42 (a),
{u),

(b),

(v),

(c),

(w),

(e),

(y),

(g),

{i),

(cc) and (dd)).

There was large accumulations of garbage and debris shown
over the grounds (Exs.
(15), and (16)).

42 (x), 44 (2),

(3),

(4),

(5),

(9),

(14),

Employees had used the insulation on the

walls as dart boards, the glass rods being substituted for
darts

(Tr. Vol. I, p. 51; Vol. I, pp. 44-45; Exs. 42 (h),

(v)).

The metal skin of the building was damaged in many places by
heavy objects being thrust against it (Exs. 42(f),
(w) ,

(aa) , and 4 8 ( 8) ) .

(o),

Insulation had been torn from the walls

over most of the building (Exs. 42 (e),
(t)).

(k),

(g),

(h),

(p),

(r),

The asphalt pavement surrounding the building was

covered with chemicals and was broken up and separated (Exs.
42 (o),

(x), 44 (10),

(11),

(12)).

Many of the plumbing fixtures

had been clogged and broken (Exs. 42(y),

(z),

(d)).

Keate's

office was piled high with debris (Exs. 42(m), 42(ee)).

The

company had permitted large accumulations of fiber glass resin
on the floor of the building (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 3-4; Exs. 42(1),
(n),

(p),

(bb)).

A piece of this resin which was pulled from

the floor is before the court as Exhibit 45.

Keate admitted

that accumulations of the type demonstrated by Exhibit 45 were
over 30% of the floor area (Tr. Vol. I, p. 60) and accumu 1a tion'·
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of a lesser depth covered another 20% of the building (Tr. Vol.
I, p. 61) ·

This fiber glass resin grows harder with the passage

of time and becomes more difficult to remove (Tr. Vol. II,
p. 101).

Inasmuch as the Stone Company was not notified that

Fiber Glass Products had vacated the building (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 46, 85), the resin sat for three months.

When notice was

finally received that the building was vacant, it required
jackhammers (Tr, Vol. II, p. 3), and bulldozers (Tr. Vol. IV,
p. 29), to remove the material from the floors.
The accumulation of debris, resin and damage to the
building made the premises untenantable (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 6-7),
28).

Since tenantability was a condition of the lease guarantee

insurance (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 12-13, Ex. 14), Stone Company
was unable to receive any benefits under the lease guarantee
insurance until the building was cleaned and repaired (Ex. 14).
By reason of the extensive damage and accumulations
of debris and resin, the cost of repair and clean-up was more
than John R. Stone or Stone Company could expend.

Accordingly,

John R. Stone and Stone Company applied for a loan with the
Lockhart company secured by the building (Ex. 1).

All proceeds

of the loan including some of Stone's personal funds were
used for the clean-up and repair of the building (Exs. 49, 50;
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Tr. Vol. III, pp. 16-38).

The funds were insufficient to pay

for the entire operation, and so a portion was financed by
promissory notes from John R. Stone and Stone Company to Mr.
Stone's father (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8).

John R. Stone personally

spent a lot of time in assisting in the repair and clean-up
of the premises.

The value of his services were $5,156.20

(Ex. 50, 69; Tr. Vol. III, p. 30).
were completed in May, 1975

The clean-up oeprations

(Tr. Vol. III, p. 49).

The total

cost, of the repair and clean-up was $19,606.50 (Ex. 50).

Loan

proceeds of $15, 000. 00 from Lockhart Company were used to pay
these expenses.

The garbage and debris was so extensive that

it required forty loads in dump trucks with 15 yard beds to hau.
it away (Tr. Vol. IV, p.

30).

Keate waited until after the clean-up and repair was
completed and then served a notice (Ex. 5) upon John R. Stone
that Keate intended to exercise the Option.

Notice was

received by the Stone Company on September 8, 1975 (Ex. 5).
The Notice sent by Keate stated terms which were different from
the terms set forth in the Option.

Keate admitted during the

course of the trial that he knew that the terms stated in his
Notice of Exercise were not in accordance with what he knew to
.
.
· sly draft&
be the actual terms of the Option his attorney previou
(Tr. Vol. IV, p. 102).

The Option agreement had originally

been prepared by Gerald Turner who acted as Keate's
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attorney (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 98).

When the Option was drafted,

Turner explained to Keate that the purchase price under the
Option included 10% of $125,000.00 (Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 33, 77).
Yet in his Notice of Exercise Keate claimed the figure was
10% of $117,000.00 (Ex. 5).
Upon receipt of the Notice of Exercise, Stone responded
through counsel that the Notice proposed terms different than
those stated in the Option (Ex. 6).

However, since the original

Option Agreement was attached to the Notice and the Notice
stated that the attached Option was exercised, Stone was llnsure
as to whether it constituted an exercise on the basis of the
original terms or a counter-offer.

Thus, with the hope of

clarifying the matter, Stone noted in his response that he would
regard it as a valid exercise of the Option according to its
original terms and confirmed the closing date for September 18,
1975 (Ex. 6; Tr. Vol. I, p. 30).
Stone appeared at the closing with a warranty deed
ready for delivery to Keate describing the real property
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 80-81; Vol. IV, p. 54; Ex. 15).

Keate failed

to appear at the closing and refused to perform any of the
obligations of the Option contract (Tr. Vol. I, PP· 30-31).
Keate has never tendered any type of performance either on the
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closing date or at any date thereafter up to and including the
date of the corrunencement of this action (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 30-3l)
Since Keate insisted that the varied terms were the
only acceptable terms, Stone Company corrunenced this action to
clear up the problem since it left the title to the land in an
uncertain position.

Stone Company's Amended Complaint sought

two alternative remedies:

(a) a declaration that the Option be

declared null and void and of no further force and effect; (bl
a decree of specific performance be entered on the basis of the
actual terms of the Option.
The lower court entered a declaratory judgment construir.
various terms and provisions of the Option Agreement, but did
not decree specific performance and did not declare the Option
as null and void.
Plaintiff-appellant asserts that under the facts and
circumstances of the case the lower court should have declared
the Option null and void.

In the event the Option is not

declared null and void, plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal
of some of the constructions of the lower court with respect to
the Option.

Neither party has appealed the Court's failure to

grant specific performance.
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POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE OPTION VOID.
Stone Company has no dispute with the factual determinations made by the trial court.

The issue presented on this appeal

is that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by not
granting appropriate relief.

Under the facts and circumstances of

the case, the Option should have been declared void.

There are

only three views of the transaction and each view, under the
established law, compels the conclusion that the Option is void or
no longer capable of exercise.
follows:

The three alternatives are as

(a) the Option was duly exercised by Keate, and the

resulting contract was breached by Keate;

(b) the Option was

rejected by Keate by reason of his counter-offer incorporating
different terms and conditions; (c) the Option was never exercised
by Keate and was revoked by Stone inasmuch as it was not supported
by any consideration.

Each of these alternatives will be

separately discussed.
ALTERNATIVE (a):

Option exercised, resulting contract breached.

Paragraph 3 of the Option to Purchase (Ex. 3) states
that the Option may be exercised by written notice, signed by
the Optionee, and sent registered mail to the Optionor.
on September 8, 1975, a Notice of Exercise of Option
(Ex. 5) was served on John R. Stone, President of J. R. Stone
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Attached to the Notice was a xeroxed copy of the

original Option to Purchase.

The first paragraph of the Notic,

clearly and unequivocally stated that Keate intended to
exercise the attached Option.

However, the remainder of the

Notice purported to impose a construction of the Option which
Keate knew was incorrect (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77; Vol. II, p. 34;
Vol. IV, p. 102).

Stone Company was faced with a dilemma:

should it rely on the first paragraph which unequivocally
exercised the Option by incorporating the original terms
which all parties understood, or should it rely on the
extraneous wording which all parties knew was incorrect?
Stone elected to treat the Option as an exercise according to
the actual terms and forwarded a Notice to this effect to Keate
(Ex.

6).
Where, as here, there was a subjective meeting of the

minds, Keate's attempt to try for a better deal should be
treated as mere surplusage.

See Hawaiian Equipment Co. v.

Eimco Corp., 115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794

(1949); Chournos v.

Evona Inv. co., 97 Utah 351, 93 P.2d 450 (1939).

Any other

holding would permit Keate to benefit by creating an ambiguity
for the purpose of permitting him to purchase or decline to
purchase, depending on later developments.
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-13Inasmuch as an Option is considered a continuing offer,
Williams v. Morgan, 11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d 903 (1961),
the receipt of the Notice of Exercise constituted an acceptance
of that offer and the existence of a contract to purchase.
Stone Company's reply confirmed a closing date of September 18,
1975, which was within the time stated in Keate's Notice of
Exerxise.
Stone Company prepared a warranty deed and had the same
ready for delivery on September 18, 1975, at the offices of
Stone Company's attorney (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 80-81; Vol. IV, p. 54;
Ex. 15).

Keate did not appear at the closing and never tendered

the purchase price and has never attempted to perform his obligations (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 30-31).
The Option or the offer became part of a contract which
was formed by acceptance, and was clearly and unequivocally
breached by Keate.

By reason thereof, the Option constituted

a component of the breached contract and is no longer existing.
ALTERNATIVE (b):

The Option to Purchase was refused and

rejected by Keate's Counter-Offer.
under this alternative, the wording of the Notice which
was inconsistent with the provisions of the Option itself,
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-14rather than considered as surplusage, is treated as a counteroffer.

As stated in Hawaiian Equipment Company v. Eimco

Corporation, 115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794

(1949):

"An acceptance which imposes terms or
conditions not present in the offer has no validity
and • . . its only recognition is as a counteroffer."
Paragraph 4 of the Option to Purchase clearly states:
"If this Option is exercised, the total
purchase price shall be the amount of the first
mortgage that Optionor has executed with the
Mortgagee, Valley Bank & Trust Company,
$125,000.00 plus ten percent (10%) of the
amount of said mortgage.
The Optionee in
addition to the purchase price will pay all
costs of closing."
The wording of this paragraph clearly establishes the
purchase price as $125, 000. 00 plus ten percent of that amount.
There is nothing in the paragraph that suggests that the 10%
rate would be applied to the reduced balance of the mortgage
at the time of the Exercise.

The trial court confirmed the

meaning of said paragraph, that it meant 10% of $125,000.00
rather than 10% of the reduced balance of the mortgage (R. 1451
Nevertheless, the terms of the Notice of Exercise of
the Option which was served on Stone Company by Keate stated:
"It is my understanding that said mortgage
is in the approximate amount of $117,000.00 at
the present time, and that 10% added to that
amount equals $128,700.00."
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-15In asserting that the 10% rate should be applied to the
reduced balance of the mortgage, Keate was fully aware that his
position was a departure from the intended meaning of the
Option Agreement (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 102).

During the course

of the trial he admitted that Turner had explained to him,
and that he had understood, that the purchase price would be
10% of the original loan balance and not the reduced balance at
the time of Exercise (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77; Vol. IV, p. 102).
In the Notice of Exercise of Option Keate also asserted
construction of the Option which were obviously not in accordance with the terms.

He asserted that the purchase price

provisions set a ceiling on the purchase price of $128,700.00
and used this to argue that he was not obligated to assume all
liens and encumbrances despite the wording of the Option:
"It is also my understanding that under
paragraph 5 that there are at present two liens
against the property, one to Valley Bank & Trust
Company in the amount of $117,000.00 as stated
above, plus a lien obligation to the LOckhart
Company in the amount of approximately
$15,000.00 for a total of $132,000.00, which is
$3,300.00 more than the purchase price under the
Option. Because the purchase price cannot
exceed $128,700.00, the net difference which you
are obligated to refund to me is $3,300.00, plus
delivering to me a good and sufficient warranty
deed."
This total departure from the wording of the Option
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constituted a counter-offer which has the effect of constituting a rejection and termination of the original offer.
In Chournos v. Evona Inv. Co., 97 Utah 335, 93 P.2d 450
(1939), this Court stated the applicable rule as follows:
''To constitute a valid exercise of an option
and impose a duty on the vendor to convey, the
terms and conditions of the option must be complied
with by the purchaser.
If he attaches to his
acceptance conditions, not warranted by the terms
of the option, or notice of his election to buy
this itself amounts to a rejection • . • we can see
no reason for reinstating Chournos under the terms
of the option - terms that he practically repudiated
by his counter-offer."
(Emphasis Added).
The instant case is very similar to the facts in the Chournos
case.

There is here an intentional departure from the terms

of the of fer in an attempt to obtain advantages which the
offeree knows are not within the terms of the offer.

Such

action is clearly a rejection of the offer.
In Beaumont v. Prieto, 249 U.S. 554 (1919), the optione:
served a notice of exercise of an option to purchase land that
departed substantially from the terms of the option.

The Supre:

Court of the United States noted a long established rule of law:
"Plaintiff made an offer of his own and he
thereby rejected the offer previously made by
defendant.
It was not afterwards competent
for him to revive the proposal of defendant,
by tendering an acceptance of it."
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In Trautwein v. Leavey, 472 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1970), the
court stated the rule as follows:
"If an offer is rejected, either by an
absolute refusal or by an acceptance conditionally or not identical with the terms
of the offer, or by a counter-proposal, the
party making the original offer is relieved
from liability on that offer; and the party
who has rejected the offer cannot afterward,
at his own option, convert the same offer
into an agreement by subsequent acceptance. •
The power of acceptance created by an ordinary
offer is terminated by a conununicated rejection.
This is true even though a definite time was
given by the offerer for considering his
offer and the rejection is before that time
has expired. When the offerer receives a
notice of rejection, he is very likely to
change his position in reliance thereon ••
This has led to the rule that a definite
rejection terminates the offeree's power
to accept."
By reason of the intentional rejection of the offer,
the refusal to comply with the terms of the Option, this Court
should declare the Option null and void in accordance with the
acts of the Optionee, Raymond Keate.
ALTERNATIVE (c):

0ption not exercised and later revoked.

The law is clear that an option constitutes nothing
more than an offer.

An

offer not supported by consideration

can be withdrawn at any time prior to acceptance.
It is important to note that all of the transactions

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18involved in this matter, except for the Option, were between
J. R.

Stone Company and Fiber Glass Products Company.

Raymond

Keate was not a party to any of these other transactions.
Stone purchased the building for use by Fiber Glass Products
(Tr. Vol. II, p.

49).

When the lease of the premises was

executed, i t was between Stone Company and Fiber Glass Products
(Ex.

4) .

The working capital loan was a loan for and on behalf

of Fiber Glass Products and all proceeds were used by Fiber
Glass Products

(Tr. Vol.

I, pp. 36-38; Vol. IV, p.

89).

However, the Option to Purchase, was granted in favor of Raymor.:
Keate personally.

Keate acknowledged that there was no written

resolution of the Board of Directors authorizing him to personally receive this benefit from negotiations which involved
the company only (Tr. Vol.

III, P. 14).

Keate acknowledged that by granting the Option to him
personally, no objective of the company was thereby served
(Tr. Vol.

III, p. 12-13).

The sole purpose was to benefit him

personally and enable him to maintain an asset despite any
failure of the operations of the company (Tr. Vol. III, P·

12-13).
Although the Option recites the granting of a consideration, no such consideration was ever paid (Tr. Vol. I,
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In such circumstances, the Option may be revoked

by the optionor at any time prior to a valid exercise.
rule

The

has been stated as follows:
"If no consideration passes, the transaction
itself into a mere offer which may be
withdrawn by the optionor at any time before
acceptance by the optionee." Whitworth v. Eni tai
Lumber Company, 220 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1950).
r~solves

In further support of the above rule are:

Small v. Paulson,

209 P.2d 779 (Ore. 1949); Prather v. Vasquez, 327 P.2d 963
(Cal. 1958); Pittsburg Equitable Meter Co. v. Paul

c.

Loeber

&

Company, 160 F.2d 721 (7th Cir. 1947).
Inasmuch as the Notice of Exercise under this Alternative
did not amount to an acceptance, the offer was revoked by the
filing of this lawsuit which sought a decree that the Option
be declared null and void.
Keate may argue that the consideration for the Option
although not corning from him, came from Fiber Glass Products
by the entry into the lease arrangement.

However, the lease

could not be construed as consideration for the Option inasmuch
as it was the unrelated obligation of a separate party.

Moreover,

even if the lease could be regarded as consideration for the
Option, it was flagrantly breached by Fiber Glass Products and
therefore fails as adequate consideration.
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THE DOCTRINE OF I.ACHES BARS KEATE'S EXERCISE OF OPTION.
At the trial, plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant's
counterclaim on the ground that it failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted (Tr. Vol. I, p. 9).

on

the basis of the Court's response to this Motion, defendant
moved to amend his counterclaim to assert reformation.

This

Motion was granted by the Court over plaintiff's objection
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 8, 12).

The basis of defendant's objection

was that such a claim was unantici~ated and gave rise to equitable defenses that plaintiff had no opportunity to raise
(Tr. Vol. I, pp. 8, 14; Vol. II, p. 37; Vol. II, p. 109).
The Court proceeded on the basis that any equitable claims
or defenses were permitted (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 3-16).
With all equitable claims open by the Court, Stone
Company placed into evidence facts which support the contention
that Keate's right to exercise the Option is barred by the
doctrine of laches.
The grounds for application of the doctrine of laches
were stated in Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah, 1975), as
follows:
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"To constitute laches, two elements must be
established:
(1) the lack of diligence on
th~ part of plaintiff; (2) an injury to defendant
owing to such lack of diligence. Although lapse
of t~me is an essential part of laches, the length
of time must depend on the circumstances of each
case, for the propriety of refusing a claim
is equally predicated upon the gravity of the
prejudice suffered by defendant and the length
of plaintiff's delay."
The circumstances of the instant case compel the
conclusion that there was an intentional delay made in bad
faith and that by reason thereof Stone Company was severally
prejudiced.
The evidence establishes that while Keate was in full
control of the operations of Fiber Glass Products (Tr. Vol. I,
pp. 41-42) the building and grounds were abused and damaged
in total disregard of the obligations of the lease (see citations
to Record on pages 5-7, supra.).

By reason of this damage,

the building was totally unfit for occupancy at the time it
was vacated by Fiber Glass Products (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 6-7, 28).
While the premises were in this condition, Keate made
no attempt to exercise his option.

Rather, he waited until

Stone company had borrowed money and completed an extensive
repair and clean-up operation.

After the clean-up and repair

operations were completed and the premises were again tenantable
and capable of producing income Keate exercised the Option.
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-22This failure to assert his right is ample justificatiori
for the application of the doctrine of laches.

However, the

delay in prejudice to Stone Company did not end with the
exercise of the Option.
When Keate gave notice of his intent to exercise the
Option, he added insult to injury by claiming that he should
not have to assume the mortgage to the Lockhart Company which
was incurred to generate funds to pay for the clean-up and
repair.

Despite the wording of the Option, that it was "subjec

to all liens and encumbrances of record" Keate claimed that
Stone Company should deduct the cost of cleaning up Keate's
debris

(Ex. 5; R. 102).

This claim, together with the claim

that the purchase price was to be 10% of $117,000.00, which
Keate knew was unwarranted, caused further delay and prejudice
to Stone Company.
The economic effect on Stone Company has been devastati:
The clean-up and repair operations required the expenditure of
funds in excess of $19, 000. 00.

The time and attention of the

employees of Stone Company diverted them from their normal busi·
ness activity, a loss that will never be recovered.

Inasmuch a:

the damage caused by Keate and Fiber Glass Products made the pr:
mises untenantable, Stone Company lost the income from the
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-23property for a period of more than ten months, and was unable
to benefit by the lease guarantee insurance which is conditional
upon tenantability of the premises.

Stone Company has been

required to prosecute and defend a lawsuit that has been pending
for more than twenty-two months at a cost of more than $5,000.00.
All of the legal action has been for the purpose of permitting
Keate to find judicial sanction for a construction of the Option
which he knew was not in accordance with the intent of the parties.
It would be difficult to conceive of a case more
deserving of the application of equitable principals than this
case before the court.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE TERMS OF THE OPTION.
In the event the Court holds that the Option should
have been declared null and void, it will be unnecessary to
consider this Point on appeal inasmuch as it involves a
construction of the Option in the event of later exercise.
During the course of the trial, the testimony established
that in connection with the clean-up and repair operations,
Stone Company engaged the services of John Stone's father
who worked continuously in the building from February 1, 1975
to May 1, 1975.

(Tr. vol. I, pp. 8-11).

Stone Company reimbursed
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-24the elder Mr. Stone for this work by deli'very of a promissory
·
note in the sum of $2,SOO.OO together with a mortgage on anoth'
piece of property owned by Stone Company (Tr. Vol. I, p. 8;
Ex. Sl).
The value of labor and other services performed by
John R. Stone personally amounted to $S,1S6.20 (Ex. SO; Tr.
Vol. III, p.

30).

Of the sum, $2,316.60 was paid from proceed:

of the Lockhart loan (Ex. SO, 69).

This left a balance of

$2,839.60 (Ex. SO).
The Court refused to make Keate's Option subject to
these obligations on the ground that they were not liens and
encumbrances "of record" and that any lien in favor of John R.
Stone would be merged into his ownership of the premises.

The

court limited the liens which Keate would have to pay to liens
recorded pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated

(R. 174-17S).
The Option to Purchase was prepared by Gerald Turner
acting exclusively as Raymond Keate's attorney (Tr. Vol. I,
p. 29).

That Option provided:
"Upon receipt of the purchase price within
the time allowed, the Optionor will promptly
execute and deliver to the Optionee a good
and sufficient warranty deed, subject to all
liens and encumbrances of record • . . "
By reason of the performance of labor and services

on the building in question, John R. Stone and Royal Stone,
his father, are granted a lien by the provisions of Section
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38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated.

That section specifically states

that "all persons performing any service or furnishing any
materials used in the construction, alteration or improvement
of any building or improvement to any premises in any manner.
shall have a lien upon the property • • • "
It is true that if John R. Stone or Royal Stone were
commencing an action to enforce the lien, such suit would be
barred by the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-7
since they did not record their liens within the designated
time period.

However, the issue before the court is not

whether John Stone and Royal Stone may maintain such an
action, but whether Keate must pay the lien under the terms
of the Option Agreement.
The recording provisions of Section 38-1-7, Utah
Code Annotated, are for the purpose of imparting notice of
the lien and to provide a plan of priorities.

In this instance,

Stone Company and Raymond Keate both are in possession with
knowledge sufficient to put them on actual notice that an
extensive clean-up and repair operation was undertaken and
there is no priority question with respect to the lien.
There is no merger of the lien of John R. Stone with
the title of Stone company, inasmuch as they are separate
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Moreover, the lien imposed by Section 38-1-3,

Utah Code Annotated, extends to the interest of the lessee.
Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d
517 (1957).
Even if the lien was not imposed by the provisions
of the contract, or is barred by the provisions of Title 38,
Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, the trial court should have
imposed said lien as an equitable lien.
Equitable liens arise by contract or by conduct by
of the parties.

American Investors Life Insurance Company v.

Greenshield Plan, Inc., 358 P.2d 473 (Col. 1971).

When

equitable liens are imposed on the basis of contract, it
must appear that the parties intended to create charge upon
the designated property.
235 P. 2d 510 (1951).

Olson v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443,

However, equitable liens imposed on the

basis of the conduct of the parties will be imposed if in
the circumstances they will do justice and equity or prevent
unjust enrichment.

American Investors Life Insurance Compan_Y..

Greenshield Plan, Inc., 358 P.2d 473 (Col. 1971); Mannon v.
Pesula, 139 P.2d 336

(Cal. 1943); Barnes v. Eastern and Wes~

Lumber Co., 287 P. 2d 929 (Ore. 1955).

Equitable liens will al

be imposed to prevent injustice when a party has no adequate
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Oregon Mutual Insurance Co. v.

c.

E. cornelism,

330 P.2d 161 (Ore. 1958).
The facts and circumstances of the instant case
require the intervention of equity and the imposition of an
equitable lien to prevent unjust enrichment to Raymond Keate.
As previously noted, at the time Fiber Glass Products vacated
the building it was under the supervision and control of
Raymond Keate (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 41-42).

Raymond Keate knew many

days prior to the termination of business of the company
that they were going to vacate the building and had employees
available and at his disposal (Tr. Vol. I, p. 47).

Neverthe-

less, he chose to shift the expense of the repair and clean-up
to the Stone Company because he gave no employees any instruction
to clean or repair the building at the time the company vacated
it (Tr. Vol. I, P. 47).

This action on his part was in

direct violation of the provisions of the lease (Ex. 4, ,110).
By this flagrant breach of the lease, and by the
intentional acts on the part of Raymond Keate

in withholding

services of his employees working in the building, the expense
of this massive clean-up operation fell upon the Stone Company.
Equity should intervene and not permit Raymond Keate to
benefit by such action.

The imposition of an equitable lien
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-28would shift the burden to the party who should have borne
the expense in the first instance.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court
erred and abused its discretion in limiting the provisions
of paragraph 5 of the Option only to those liens recorded
pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated.
CONCLUSION
Stone Company has no dispute with any of the factual
determinations made by the trial court.

The basis of this

appeal is that those facts compel the granting of the remedy
sought by the Amended Complaint in this action.

It is

respectfully submitted that the facts and circumstances of
the case compel the conclusion that the Option to Purchase
should be declared null and void thereby clearing title to
the property in question.
Respectfully subm

July, 1977.
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